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Summary 
This paper discusses the impact of recent social security reform on the development of sustainability 
as well as adequacy in Belgium. The impact analyses in this paper have been done using two separate 
yet consistent models. The analysis of the budgetary impact is based on the MALTESE system of 
models (Model for Analysis of Long-Term Evolution of Social Expenditure). The analysis of the 
adequacy of the social security reform is done using the most recent version of the dynamic 
microsimulation model MIDAS (Microsimulation for the Development of Adequacy and 
Sustainability). 
The structural reforms of December 2011 reduce the budgetary cost of ageing by 0.3 percentage point 
of GDP between 2011 and 2060, evenly distributed between pensions, unemployment and 
Conventional Early Leavers’ Scheme / Unemployment with Company Allowance (CELS/UCA). 
Besides the direct impact of the measures themselves, the increased GDP resulting from the reform 
decreases, of course the weight of social expenses in percent of GDP.  
The risk of poverty rate of retirees decreases progressively as a result of the reform. In 2060, the 
reduction should reach 4 percentage points (4 percentage points for men and 5 percentage points for 
women). Furthermore, the poverty risk of male unemployed, in particular, increases considerably. 
 
Keywords: Social security reform, Belgium, financial sustainability, adequacy, poverty. 
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1. Introduction 
For many western countries including Belgium, population ageing constitutes an important budgetary 
and social challenge. They are therefore taking measures to deal with the issue. The Belgian 
governmental agreement of December 2011 included a social security reform which, for certain 
aspects, came into force in 2012. 
The aim of those measures is primarily to strengthen the financial viability or sustainability of the 
social security system (specifically first-pillar – or legal public pensions), i.e. to reduce its costs in a 
context of demographic ageing, especially through limiting early retirement. However, such a series of 
measures inevitably also has consequences on the adequacy of pension benefits in the first pillar2. The 
question then is how important those impacts are.  
This paper aims to discuss the impact of the recent social security reform on the development of 
financial sustainability as well as adequacy in Belgium. The impact analyses in this paper have been 
done using two separate yet consistent models. The analysis of the budgetary impact of social security 
reform (pensions, as well as the conventional early leavers’ scheme and general unemployment 
scheme) is based on the MALTESE system of models (Model for Analysis of Long-Term Evolution of 
Social Expenditure), which is a composition of accounting models used to translate demographic and 
economic projections into budgetary developments. The analysis of the adequacy of the social security 
reform is done using the most recent version of the dynamic microsimulation model MIDAS 
(Microsimulation for the Development of Adequacy and Sustainability)3. This model simulates the 
lives of actual individuals and households in Belgium, starting from a representative administrative 
sample of about 2.2 million individuals in 2001. A discerning character of MIDAS is that it aligns 
with the simulation results of MALTESE. Consistency between the two models is achieved through 
various channels, previously described in Dekkers, Inagaki and Desmet (2012), which will be outlined 
in section 3.  
The paper will report the results of this joint analysis of recent social security reform in Belgium. 
Thus, the projected budgetary impacts will be discussed along with the impact on the evolutions of the 
adequacy of pensions and unemployment benefits in Belgium. The former will focus on the labour 
market, the macro-economic environment and social expenditures. The latter uses social indicators, 
such as poverty risk and inequality, and (re)distribution indicators for the population as well as for 
specific groups. 
This introduction ends with the discussion of a caveat. Besides the pension reform, the Di Rupo 
administration also introduced, among others, a reform in the unemployment and career break 
schemes. For an extended discussion on this matter, we refer to the annual report of the High Council 
of Finances (2012, pp. 44-46). These reforms, of course, also have their budgetary impact, which will 
                                                          
2  Adequacy can be defined as 1) to maintain living standards while not working, 2) to prevent poverty and 3) to smooth lifetime 
consumption. See Dekkers et al. (2009, 1) for a discussion on pension adequacy. In this paper, however, the analysis focuses on the at-
risk-of-poverty rate of pensioners and/or the unemployed. 
3  The versions of both models used in this paper are those used for the 2012- report of the Study Committee on Ageing (High Council of 
Finance 2012), for which the team “Social protection, demography and prospective” of the Federal Planning Bureau produces and 
simulates the various scenarios. 
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be briefly presented in section 4. But the impact of the unemployment reform on pension adequacy 
(and vice versa) is at best indirect, namely via changes of the poverty line and via the impact of the 
unemployment benefit on the equivalent household income of pensioners – and hence only for 
households made up of both pensioners and unemployed persons. Those indirect effects are less 
relevant for the analysis, but distort the picture in that it is very difficult to discern the impact of both 
reforms when they are simulated jointly. To exclude those indirect effects, this paper considers the 
impact of the reform of the pension system (including conventional early leavers’ scheme) on the 
poverty risk of pensioners only, while the impact of the reform of the unemployment and career break 
schemes is expressed in terms of its impact on the poverty risk of the unemployed only.  
Section 2 of this paper describes the recent social security reform in Belgium. The two models used to 
estimate the budgetary and social impact of the reform are presented in the third section. Section 4 
illustrates the budgetary impact of the structural reforms while section 5 analyses the social impact of 
the reforms.  
Since the reform is very recent, there is not much work on the assessment of its consequences to date. 
A recent paper by Jousten et al. (2012) is the most notable exception. This present paper aligns with 
theirs in the joint assessment of the impact of reform on macroeconomic aggregates, but also on 
individuals. Furthermore, both their and our microsimulation models are based on essentially the same 
administrative dataset. Their work, however, differs from ours in various respects. First of all, they use 
static microsimulation techniques to express the impact of reform in ‘accrued to date pension rights’, 
i.e. the discounted pension rights that would be due if the system were shut down today. This paper, on 
the other hand, uses dynamic macro modelling jointly with dynamic microsimulation to a forward-
looking approach, taking into account the intertemporal impact of the reform and how reform changes 
“the future generosity of these programs” (Fernández, 2012, 78). Secondly, our approach is 
conceptually simpler in that we simulate the intertemporal development of the poverty risk of 
pensioners and the unemployed, respectively, in a scenarios with and without reforms. Thirdly and 
most importantly, the above study chooses to “focus on a set of hypothetical reform scenarios rather 
than follow the reform as recently initiated by the Di Rupo government” (Jousten et al., 2012, 22), 
whereas our paper pertains to the budgetary and social impacts of the recent actual social security 
reform.  
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2. Recent social security reform in Belgium 
Belgium has a Bismarckian-style first-pillar (a.k.a. public or social security) pension system, toned 
down by several floors and ceilings, as well as a means-tested minimum pension benefit (an assistance 
scheme named the guaranteed income for the elderly). Besides this assistance scheme, there are three 
main separate schemes: one for wage earners (in the private sector as well as for contract employees in 
the public sector), another for civil servants and a third for the self-employed.  
As in many countries, Belgium experiences demographic ageing, which impacts the expected cost of 
this pension system as a percentage of GDP (see High Council of Finances (2012) for a discussion). 
This situation is aggravated by the recent economic crisis, causing a slowdown of GDP and a 
reduction of the contribution base via a decrease in the employment rate and a slowdown in the growth 
rate of real wages. Furthermore, the employment rate of older workers in Belgium is very low 
compared to the other European Union Member States. Furthermore, there was concern about the at-
risk-of-poverty rate of pensioners, at least for specific groups among them. All this resulted in three 
recent periods of pension reform4.  
The last important pension reform was the 1996 reform for wage earners and self-employed workers. 
It was discussed in Festjens (1997) and aimed mainly at gradually increasing the retirement age of 
women (from 60 to 65 by 2009). Early retirement (from the age of 60) was submitted to a career 
length condition of at least 35 years as of 2005. A "minimum claim per working year" was introduced 
in the wage earners’ scheme. 
Afterwards, the scheme of guaranteed income for elderly persons (GIEP) was reformed on 1 June 
2001 with the individualization of the allowance. The basic amount of the guaranteed income has been 
increased significantly by various administrations since then. For instance, in an attempt to safeguard 
the adequacy of first-pillar pensions, the Leterme administration in 2006 increased the GIEP and the 
minimum claim per working year by about 14% (Whitehouse et al., 2009, 519). The impacts of these 
measures on pension adequacy and financial sustainability are discussed in De Vil et al. (2010) and 
Dekkers et al. (2012) and fall outside the scope of this paper. 
After a prolonged period of political stalemate, the Di Rupo administration introduced in the law 
pronounced 28 December 2011 a number of measures reforming the first-pillar pension system, the 
unemployment scheme for older wage earners, and the general unemployment benefit system in 
Belgium5. The goal of this reform was to reduce the cost of the pension system by delaying retirement 
and increasing the activity rate of older workers. According to the most recent projections of the Study 
Committee on Ageing of October 2012, the budgetary costs of pensions6 without the recent reform 
                                                          
4  Koromzay (2004) is one of the few to directly define “reform” by making a difference with arbitrary policy changes. He defines reform 
as actions to take “away rents that have built up in the economic system or, to broaden the concept somewhat, to reduce or modify 
acquired rights” (op. cit. 1), and with the aim to improve the efficiency of resource allocation. In addition, however, we feel that this 
definition might be completed by adding that reform consists of at least one policy change (and likely more) and serves an explicit goal. 
See Schokkaert and Van Parijs (2003) and Fornero (2003) for a discussion on social justice and pension reform in Europe, and Disney 
(2004), O’Brien (2010) and Whitehouse et al., (2009) for a discussion on the paradigms in pension reform. 
5  Despite the somewhat exceptional political circumstances, the timing of this reform as well as the arguments to legitimate it are broadly 
in line with the conclusions drawn by Fernández (2012) on the basis of the study of pension retrenchments in 19 OECD countries. 
6  Together with old-age pensions, they also include survivor’s pensions, the GIEP and “availability before retirement” for teaching 
personnel. Pensions of public companies are also taken into account. 
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should increase by 4.7% of GDP between 2011 and 2060. This projected growth in costs, together 
with an historical low participation rate of older people in Belgium, are the main motivations behind 
recent reforms. 
This section will discuss the broad lines of the 2011 reform, including a number of amendments and 
complements7. The next sections will then assess the impacts on both financial sustainability and the 
adequacy of the first-pillar pension system (including conventional early leavers’ scheme or CELS) 
and of the unemployment system. 
Most OECD countries adopt three routes to reducing public pension expenditures (OECD, 2012, 30; 
see also Whitehouse et al., 2009): reduced indexation of benefits, increased legal retirement age and 
tighter rules for early retirement. The first two pathways have not been taken (yet) in Belgium; instead, 
policy has focused on the third pathway, reducing the possibilities for early retirement, together with 
adapting the rules for calculating the benefit at retirement. 
The discussion of the pension reform in Belgium starts with the latter. Before 2013, early retirement 
was possible for wage earners and the self-employed from the age of 60 with a career of at least 35 
years. With the reform, this minimum age is gradually being increased by steps of 6 months per year, 
until reaching 62 years in 2016. The minimum career length for early retirement also increases from 
35 career years to 38 career years in 2013, and then gradually by one extra career year per calendar 
year, until reaching 40 career years in 2015. Before the reform, civil servants were not subject to an 
explicit career length condition for early retirement. The majority of them8 now become subject to the 
same conditions as wage earners and the self-employed.  
The second pathway pertains to adapting the rules for calculating the benefit at retirement. The 
pension benefit a wage earner is entitled to at retirement is a function of the career length and of 
average uprated past earnings. Periods of inactivity due to unemployment, disability and illness, career 
breaks, conventional early leavers’ scheme (CELS; cf. infra) are taken into account – to a limited 
extent – as “assimilated periods”. These periods, therefore, are added to the career length. Since there 
are by definition no earnings for these periods, fictitious ‘assimilated’ earnings are used instead. 
Before 2013, these were the last earnings before becoming inactive, uprated with the price index. As a 
result of the 2013 reform, the assimilated earnings equal the minimum claim per working year for 
those that are long-term unemployed or some CELS. 
In the pension scheme for the self-employed, a penalty reduces the pension benefit if the self-
employed retires before the age of 65. Before 2013, a self-employed retiring at 60, the earliest age at 
which early retirement is possible, lost 25 percent of its pension benefit. If one retired at a later age, 
the penalty was lower, 18 or 12 percent. From 2013 onward, this penalty is abandoned for self-
                                                          
7  Detailed transitional measures, even though included in the models, will not be discussed. They might, however, be mentioned later if 
relevant in explaining simulation results. 
8  Specifically, this concerns civil servants in the regime “with tantième 1/60”. The other regimes of civil servants are also subject to 
reform, but with other transitional periods and career length conditions.  
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employed of at least 63 with a long career in any pension system. Furthermore, for the others, the 
reduction tariff or penalty is reduced9. 
A first measure in the pension scheme for civil servants is a standardization of the categories that fall 
outside the general scheme. Before the reform, specific categories such as university professors, 
catholic priests and magistrates were subject to specific rules pertaining to the accrual rate of the 
pension benefit, or the number of career years after which the full retirement benefit was reached. 
These specific categories now fall under the general scheme, albeit still with a higher accrual rate.  
Secondly, the pension benefit of all civil servants under the age of 50 on 1 January 1 2012is no longer 
based on the average earnings over the last 5 years before retirement, but on the last 10 years instead. 
This is so unless the pension benefit resulting from the latter wage-base falls under a predetermined 
minimum.  
Thirdly and analogously to wage earners, the system of ‘assimilated periods’ in the pension scheme 
for civil servants also changed. The general rule that assimilated periods cannot exceed 20 or 25 
percent (depending on age) of the active periods is maintained. However, possibilities for assimilated 
periods are extended for those aged 50 and older. Finally, an overall cap of 5 years is introduced, 
except for ‘thematic’ career breaks (parental leave, care for a seriously ill relative and palliative care). 
In this paper, we consider the pension reform in a broad sense, including the reform of the 
“prepension” or conventional early leavers’ scheme (henceforth CELS). This is a full-time or part-time 
unemployment scheme for older wage earners of the private sector in which recipients receive an 
additional benefit from the former employer equal to least to half of the gross unemployment benefit 
and the net earnings (subject to a cap) in the year prior to lay-off. The 2012 reform changed the name 
of this system to “unemployment with company allowance” (henceforth UCA) and restricts the 
system’s entry conditions. There is one general system and various specific systems, including one 
system for restructuring companies. This paper will only briefly discuss reform in the general system. 
Furthermore, the discussion will be limited to the system of full-time UCA, because the system of 
part-time CELS is suppressed by the reform. Before the reform, the standard entry condition in CELS 
was a minimum age of 60 and a career length of at least 35 years for men and 28 years for women, a 
condition which was gradually increasing to 35 years in 2028. For those with a long career of at least 
38 years, access to the CELS system was possible from the age of 58. As a result of the reform, the 
minimum age for entry into the UCA increased to 60 and the minimum career length went up to 40. 
Specific entry conditions for those with long careers are abolished.  
The unemployment scheme has also been reformed. This scheme discerns three categories of 
unemployment: cohabiting with dependants ("chômeurs cohabitants avec charge de famille"), 
cohabiting without dependants (“chômeurs cohabitants sans charge de famille") and single (“chômeurs 
isolés"), as well as three periods of unemployment. Each period has a corresponding replacement rate, 
and period lengths depend on the career length before becoming unemployed. The first period of 
unemployment corresponds to the highest replacement rate and the third period to a minimum benefit. 
                                                          
9  The Di Rupo government has since then decided to abandon this penalty system altogether from 2014 onward. As this was 
unknown at the time of implementing and simulating the reforms, the impact of this decision was not taken into account.  
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Among the three unemployment categories, cohabiting with dependants and singles are more affected 
by the reform than the cohabiting. Indeed, while cohabiting already before the reform faced a 
reduction over time of their unemployment benefits (through the third period of unemployment), the 
two other categories never entered the third period, which means they benefited from an unlimited 
second period of unemployment. The reform introduces the third period of unemployment for all 
unemployed categories and reduces the lengths of the first and second period. The impact of this 
reform is therefore less important for the cohabiting persons than for cohabiting persons with 
dependants and singles: while the former face only a reduction of their unemployment benefit sooner 
than before, the latter two now face a reduction over time of their unemployment benefits, decreasing 
towards a lump sum benefit in the third period.  
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3. Simulating the impact of social security reform: a tale of many models 
There are plenty of studies that simulate the impact of various reforms in social security and 
specifically pensions; see, for example, Zaidi and Grech (2007) for an overview. Martín and Marcos 
(2008) discern two methodological approaches to the analysis of the impact of pensions and pensions’ 
reform10. The first is “aggregate accounting” or the modelling of expenditures on the basis of 
hypotheses and assumed demographic developments. This approach focuses on the financial 
sustainability of pension systems. See De La Fuente and Doménech (2013) for a recent application. 
The above-described social security reform has an impact on the system’s budgetary costs, but might 
also affect its impact in reducing or preventing income poverty, since the two aspects are two sides of 
the same coin. The assessment of the budgetary impact of reform may therefore not be very 
meaningful without considering current or prospective developments in poverty risks, and vice versa.  
The second strand of literature uses Computable General Equilibrium Models (henceforth CGE), 
mostly to assess the redistributive impact of pensions (reform) between groups of individuals or 
households that differ by some key characteristics, usually gender, race, level of education, sometimes 
region. Within-group inequality is assumed constant. Among others, Kraev and Akolgo (2005) and 
Savard (2005) make the case for using CGE in redistribution assessment. But CGE also has some 
problems. First of all, the restriction that all redistribution occurs between groups only limits, of 
course, the information value of the impact of the system or its changes (Vos and Sanchez, 2010, 8). 
Moreover, analysing redistributive impacts on the basis of representative agents “can hide unexpected 
effects from certain combinations of individual characteristics that could not be apprehended through 
‘typical cases’ (Bourguinon and Spadaro, 2006, 78). Finally, one may question the degree to which the 
representative agents actually represent society as a whole (Martín and Marcos, 2008, 78). 
As a reaction to this, a third strand of literature emerged, combining a macro-level model with a 
microsimulation model. There are numerous studies that combine static microsimulation models with 
static CGE (see Bourguignon et al., 2010, and Colombo, 2010, for an overview and discussion and for 
the various papers of this special issue of the International Journal of Microsimulation for 
applications). In dynamics, such micro-macro combinations are uncommon and do not focus on 
pensions or pension reform (for an overview, see Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2006; 97). The paper by 
Buddelmeyer et al., 2012 is a recent example of a static-ageing technique used to adapt the 
microsimulation model to the macro-level data for projected periods using static ageing.  
The goal of the current paper is to assess the budgetary and social consequences of pension reform in 
an ageing society. This obviously requires a dynamic modelling approach. The usefulness of the 
aforementioned static-ageing approach for the analysis of Bismarckian-style pension systems is 
limited, since the reweighting technique does not allow for the intertemporal interdependence of 
events, so where an event happening in, say, 2020 may have an impact on pension income in 2040. 
This is very difficult to achieve via a static ageing technique, while it is a natural consequence of a 
dynamic ageing technique in microsimulation, where transition probabilities are used in a stochastic 
                                                          
10  This discussion follows them in not including the discussion of fixed-ratio models and econometric models, because it 
would take us too far. See Kraev and Akolgo (2005) for a discussion.  
10 
 
simulation applied to change the characteristics of individuals in a cross-section dataset11. This paper 
therefore jointly uses a macro-model to assess the budgetary consequences of ageing and pension 
reform, and a dynamic-ageing microsimulation model to simulate the impact of this reform on the 
poverty risk of the elderly specifically. This is done by combining the macro model with the micro 
model, through adapting the latter to the simulation results of the former. Both models as well as the 
channels of consistency by with this adaptation is done, are to be presented now. 
This paper builds on earlier work. A previous study made an assessment of pension adequacy 
consistent with the projections of the Ageing Working Group (AWG) in an international comparative 
perspective (Dekkers et al., 2010). More recent work (De Vil et al., 2010; Dekkers et al, 2012, Study 
Committee for Ageing, 2012, and this paper) apply a semi-aggregate model and a dynamic 
microsimulation model in simulating the impact of pension reform, thereby jointly assessing the 
budgetary consequences as well as the impacts on poverty and income inequality among the elderly in 
Belgium. 
The model used to assess the budgetary consequences of ageing and pension reform is MALTESE12. 
This is a composition of interdependent semi-aggregate models around one central model. The global 
accounting frame of the system relies on the national accounts. The various models are accounting 
models designed for translating demographic projections into budgetary developments such as  social 
security account and overall public finance account. Special attention is paid to modelling social 
expenses according to the calculation rules (legislation), often by scheme, gender, age and categories 
for the number of beneficiaries (new and other) and the corresponding average benefits. The latter take 
into account ceilings, minimum rules, indexation rules, et cetera. 
Pension adequacy is assessed through the dynamic microsimulation model MIDAS. Technically 
speaking, MIDAS is a dynamic population model with dynamic cross-sectional ageing. Starting from 
a cross-sectional dataset representing a population of all ages at a certain point in time, the model 
simulates the life spans of individuals in the dataset, including their interactions through household 
formation and dissolution, for the years between 2002 and 2060. The latest version of the model used 
here is being developed, tested and validated on a dataset of 300,000 individuals. The actual 
simulation runs are based on an expanded13 version of this dataset, including 2.2 million individuals or 
one fifth of the Belgian population (de Menten et al., 2012).  
Summarizing, whereas macro simulation considers averages, a micro simulation model attempts to 
take into account the heterogeneity behind the average. This allows capturing the complex interactions 
of government policies with the distribution of individuals and households.  
Now, a joint assessment on the basis of both models requires that they are capable to produce 
consistent simulations. MIDAS has an extensive alignment procedure, which allows it to be consistent 
with exogenous semi-aggregate projections and assumptions.. The methodology used is known as 
“alignment by sorting” (Li and O’Donoghue, 2014). This procedure separates the a priori risk for an 
                                                          
11  See O’Donoghue (2001) and Dekkers (2011) for a discussion on these simulation techniques and some applications.  
12  This discussion is based on section 2.2.3. of Dekkers et al. (2010), and Fasquelle et al. (2012) 
13  The expansion process of an individual with frequency weight f involves creating (f-1) copies or clones of this individual. This way, the 
size of the dataset increases as frequency weights are absorbed. See Dekkers and Cumpston (2012) for a more extensive discussion. 
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individual to be in a specific state and the proportion of all individuals being in this particular state. At 
first, individuals are ranked according to their risk of being observed in the designated state. Next, the 
alignment procedure takes the first x%, where x is an exogenous deterministic mortality rate, and 
marks them in that state. This alignment methodology allows for various ‘channels of consistency’ 
between the microsimulation model MIDAS and the semi-aggregate model MALTESE. A first 
channel of consistency is that both models use the same demographic projection. A second channel of 
consistency is that MIDAS uses alignments to adapt the proportional sizes of labour market states 
(number of people working in the private sector, public sector, as a civil servant, or as an independent 
worker) or social security category (unemployment, disability pension beneficiary, CELS beneficiary, 
old-age pensioner). A third channel of consistency is that MIDAS adopts the development from 
MALTESE. A fourth and final channel of consistency is that both models use a common social policy 
hypothesis. All channels are shown in Figure 1. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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Figure 1 shows the relations between the various models. The scheme is loosely based on the notation 
used in the Interaction Flow Modeling Language (IFML, 2014) . The hexagones denote "actions", in 
this case models. The rectangles denotes an "interface element" that provides input to the models. 
Finally, the arrows denote input-output dependencies, that is a situation where the output of one model 
is the input of the other. The black arrows reflect parameter changes, while the large arrows denote 
(changes of) numbers of individuals in various states.  
The interaction starts with MALTDEMO, which produces demographic projections (Federal Planning 
Bureau et al. (2011)). A first input of both MIDAS and MALTESE – and a first channel of consistency 
between them - pertains to demographic information. Starting from a detailed population database, the 
population projection rests on three demographic assumptions: fertility rate, life expectancy at birth 
and net migration flow (see Table 1 for an illustration of the main assumptions of the long-term base 
scenario). The resulting numbers of individuals specific to gender-age groups, are a starting point in 
MALTESE (cf. infra). Furthermore, fertility and mortality probabilities are the point of departure for 
the alignment procedures in MIDAS. 
Having projected labour market participation rates and the size of the labour force by a cohort 
approach, the macroeconomic scenario is then elaborated using the structural model S3BE (‘Small 
Supply-Side model for the Belgian Economy’). Assuming a CES production function14 with labour 
and capital as inputs, labour‐augmenting technical progress and constant returns to scale, past trends in 
labour market efficiency gains are used to compute the evolution of the structural unemployment rate. 
Next, given the unemployment rate trajectory, the development in the labour force and an assumed 
total factor productivity growth, employment and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are determined 
simultaneously (Lebrun, 2009). These are inputs for the MALTESE model, which then uses a cohort 
approach to split the given population projection into the school population, the labour force, the 
disabled persons and the others (as a residual), by gender and age. This breakdown is based on 
transition probabilities and behaviour in recent years and includes impacts of reforms. See Fasquelle et 
al. (2012) for a detailed discussion. The population is then further subdivided into labour market states 
(employment by schemes, unemployment, full-time career breaks, CELS/UCA) and inactive states 
such as retirement. This subdivision is specific for age and gender categories. Through the 
aforementioned alignment techniques, the microsimulation model MIDAS replicates the resulting 
proportional sizes of the various labour market and social security categories tables, also specific to 
age and gender15. This is the second channel of consistency between both models. 
                                                          
14  CES stands for “Constant Elasticity of Substitution”. This is a neoclassical production function, where technological change results in a 
constant percentage change in factor proportions. Thus, the marginal substitutions of the factors are constant. 
15  Note that the number of hours worked by the working population is simulated independently in MIDAS. Thus, the assumption here is 
that pension reform may affect labour supply at the extensive margin directly, but that supply at the intensive margin will remain 
unaffected. This is consistent with a central finding in the empirical labour market literature (Immervoll et al., 2007, 3). 
Figure 1: channels of consistency between MIDAS and MALTESE 
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A third channel of consistency pertains to the development of wages in both models. MALTESE uses 
the exogenous productivity development to simulate earnings growth. MIDAS uprates the earnings on 
the micro-level in such a way that the productivity growth rates used in MALTESE are replicated for 
men and women separately. As a result, both MALTESE and MIDAS adopt the actual development of 
wages between 2002 and 2011, and the mid-term projections 2012-2017 of the Federal Planning 
Bureau (2012). For the years up to 2018, the joint assumption is that the average wage growth rate 
converges gradually to its long-term level, which is 1.5% p.a. (see Table 1).  
Table 1 Main assumptions underlying the simulations of MALTESE and MIDAS 
Demographic assumptions (“Population projection 2011-2060”) 
 2011 2030 2060 
Fertility rate 1.84 1.86 1.86 
Life expectancy at birth: men 78.2 81.9 86.2 
Life expectancy at birth: women 83.4 85.8 88.8 
Net migration flow in thousands 63.0 23.4 31.9 
Socioeconomic assumptions 
Education rate Maintained at the level of the most recent observations for 
those under 15 and a function of the evolution of the 
participation rate of those 15 and older in the labour market 
Participation rate and transition from 
active status to disability, 
unemployment with company 
allowance (UCA) and retirement 
Modelling which applies to the successive generations 
probabilities of transition from one socioeconomic category to 
another, by gender and age group, and taking into account the 
effects of the already approved reforms 
Macroeconomic assumptions 
Mid-term Long-term base scenario 
Following the “Economic Forecasts 
2012-2017” of the FPB where: 
Productivity growth between 2011 
and 2017: 0.8% per year 
Unemployment rate in 2017: 11.9% 
Employment rate in 2017: 65.4% 
 
 
Productivity growth     1.50% 
Structural long-term unemployment rate      8.0% 
Social policy assumptions 
2011-2012:  
Existing legislation (measures of the 
social partners and the government) 
 
2013-2014: 
Governmental agreement of 
December 2011 
From 2015 
Wage ceiling 
Minimum claim per working year 
1.25% 
Non flat rates (general scheme) 0.50% 
Flat rates and minima 1.00% 
  
Source: High Council of Finance, Study Committee for Ageing, Yearly Report 2012 
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Finally, a fourth and final channel of consistency between the two models is introduced via the use of 
common social policy hypotheses on the intertemporal development of social security benefits and the 
various parameters, minimum benefits, floors and ceilings (see Table 1). See, among other, Dekkers et 
al. (2012) and De Vil et al. (2010) for a more extensive discussion.  
Though much effort has been put in the consistency between the two models, some fundamental 
differences between the two remain. They pertain to the level of modelling and the initial datasets. The 
semi-aggregate model MALTESE is based on a variety of meso- and macro-level data, including 
national accounts data. The microsimulation model, on the other hand, starts from a representative 
administrative sample of 300,000 actual individuals and their households, including their interactions; 
a dataset which is then extended using the sample weight to a sample of about 2.2 million individuals 
in 2001. Thus, especially in the short- and middle-term, where simulation results are more the result of 
the initial dataset and less of the models themselves, the observed trends may differ. 
15 
 
4. The budgetary impact of the structural reforms 
The budgetary impact of the structural reforms is assessed by the MALTESE system of models which 
started to be developed in 1987 by the Belgian Federal Planning Bureau, at the request of the 
government. This model allows to produce long-term social expenditure projections within the overall 
framework of public finance. Since 1987, the MALTESE system has constantly been improved. 
Between 1987 and 2001, it was used several times, either on the initiative of the FPB or to support 
economic policy-making, especially for measuring the impact of various statutory public pension 
reforms in Belgium in 1990 and 1996.  
In 2001, the law “guaranteeing a continuous reduction in public debt and the setting up of the Ageing 
Fund” was passed. The goal of the Fund was to build up a demographic reserve to finance the 
supplementary expenses pertaining to the statutory pension schemes due to ageing for the period 2010-
2030, as long as public debt was reduced to 60% of GDP. This law also initiated the creation of the 
Study Group on Ageing, which publishes a yearly report on the budgetary and social implications of 
ageing (through assessments of the budgetary cost of ageing and specific studies). The Federal 
Planning Bureau has been entrusted with the technical and administrative secretariat of the study 
group. So every year, the MALTESE system of models is applied to produce a long-term projection of 
all social expenditure for the yearly report of the Study Group on Ageing. Then, the department 
“Borrowing requirements of the Public Sector” of the High Council of Finance provides its yearly 
advice with recommendations for budgetary policy, based on the annual report of the Study Group on 
Ageing. Finally, the federal government issues an annual “Memorandum on Ageing” based on the 
annual report of the Study Group on Ageing and on the annual advice of the department “Borrowing 
requirements of the Public Sector” of the High Council of Finance.  
This section presents the budgetary impact of the recent pension reform (including the early retirement 
reform) and the impact of other, simultaneously decided, restrictive measures with regard to 
unemployment benefits and access conditions for career breaks and time credit, estimated in the 2012 
annual report of the Study Group on Ageing. The tables in this section illustrate, on the one hand, the 
evolution of the reference scenario which includes the structural reforms and, on the other hand, the 
impact of those reforms by comparing the base projection with a projection without reform. Besides 
the impact on social expenditure, the reforms also affect the labour market and the macroeconomic 
indicators. 
4.1. Labour market and macroeconomic environment 
Without the reform, the labour market hypotheses imply increasing participation and employment 
rates in the projection. The structural reforms reinforce this favourable development in the long run: 
compared to a situation without reform, the global participation rate is raised by 1 percentage point 
and the participation rate of the age category 55-64 by 6.2 percentage points by 2060 (Table 2). In the 
base projection (including the reforms), the global participation rate and the participation rate of older 
workers reach 74.5% and 64.9%, respectively, in 2060. 
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Table 2 Labour market: base scenario (with reform) and difference between projection with 
and without reform in percentage point. 
 
Base scenario (with reforms) Impact of reforms 
 2011 2030 2060 2030 2060 
Participation rate (labour forcea in % of 
population 15-64 years) 
72.7 74.2 74.5 1.0 1.0 
 15-54 years 76.5 75.6 75.6 -0.2 -0.1 
 55-64 years 52.9 64.0 64.9 5.8 6.2 
Employment rate (total employment in % of 
population 15-64 years) 
64.0 68.0 68.5 0.9 1.0 
 15-54 years 68.3 70.0 70.2 -0.2 -0.1 
 55-64 years 42.0 55.1 56.3 5.2 5.6 
Unemployment rate (unemployment in % of 
labour forcea) 
11.9 8.5 8.0 0.1 0.0 
CELS/UCA rate (% of potential labour forceb 
50-64 years) 
8.0 5.9 5.6 -1.5 -1.5 
Source: High Council of Finance, Study Committee for Ageing, Yearly Report 2012 
a. The labour force comprises total employment and unemployment. 
b. The potential labour force comprises the labour force, those that are not working and are in 
CELS/UCA, full-time career breaks and time-credit. 
Assuming that the reforms do not affect the structural unemployment rate (8%), employment should, 
in the long run, have a similar evolution as the labour force. Compared to a scenario without reform, 
the global employment rate is raised by 1 percentage point and the employment rate of the age 
category 55-64 by 5.6 percentage points by 2060. In the reference simulation, the global employment 
rate and the employment rate of those aged 55-64 amount to 68.5% and 56.3%, respectively. 
Table 1 shows that annual labour productivity growth amounts to 1.5% in the long run in the base 
scenario (from about 2030 onward). However, Table 3 shows that, over the period 2011-2060, 
productivity gains only add up to 1.3% annually on average as a result of weaker productivity growth 
in the short-to-medium term. Productivity growth in the short-to-medium run is lower than in the long 
run, because the former is determined endogenously, whereas the latter by hypothesis equals the actual 
recorded productivity growth rate of 1. 5% per year between 1980 and 2008. This time period, and 
thus the hypothesis, intentionally excludes the crisis years after 2008. For comparison, when the 
period covers 1980-2010, the average productivity growth rate only equals 1.3%. Still, the hypothesis 
of 1.5% productivity growth rate coincides with those of international organisations, including the 
OECD, and of the Ageing Working Group. In addition, the actual average annual productivity growth 
over the period 2011-2060 will not exceed 1.3% in this scenario, since productivity starts off with a 
low growth in the medium run - caused by a slightly negative difference between actual and potential 
GDP- and will only reach the hypothetical growth rate around 2026. 
Between 2011 and 2060, GDP should grow by 1.7% per year on average and employment by 0.3% per 
year (see Table 3). 
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Table 3 Macroeconomic projection: base scenario (with reform) and impact of the structural 
reforms (difference between projection with and without reform in % 
 
Base scenario (with reforms) Impact of the reforms 
 Average annual growth rates in real terms in % Level in % 
 2011-
2030 
2030-
2060 
2011-
2060 
2011-2030 2030-2060 2011-2060 2030 2060 
GDP 1.6 1.7 1.7 0.07 0.00 0.03 1.3 1.4 
Productivity 1.1 1.5 1.3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 
Employment 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.07 0.00 0.03 1.3 1.4 
Source: High Council of Finance, Study Committee for Ageing, Yearly Report 2012 
In the long term, employment growth owing to structural reforms implies an economic growth which 
is slightly higher than in a scenario without reform: 0.03% annually over the period 2011-2060 (see 
Table 3). In 2060, GDP should be 1.4% higher than in a scenario without reform. 
4.2. Social expenditures 
The next table presents the budgetary cost of ageing, or the variation of the whole social expenses 
expressed in percent of GDP between two years, firstly for the base scenario which includes the 
reforms (left column of the Table 4). In the base-scenario, social expenses should rise from 25.3% of 
GDP in 2011 to 31.4% of GDP in 2060, or a budgetary cost of ageing of 6.1 percentage points of GDP 
between 2011 and 2060. The costs of pensions and health care should increase by 7.6 percentage 
points of GDP, but the other expenditures (especially for unemployment benefits and child benefits) 
should decrease by 1.5 percentage points of GDP. The decrease in the other expenditures results, on 
the one hand, from a reducing number of beneficiaries (especially in the unemployment scheme due to 
the decrease in the unemployment rate in projection) and, on the other hand, from the social policy 
assumptions which present a partial adjustment of the social allowances to living standards (see Table 
1). Pension expenditure should increase by 4.6 percentage points of GDP between 2011 and 2060, 
which is not surprising given the rise in the demographic dependency ratio. This relates people aged 
65 and more to the population aged 15-64 and increases by 62% between 2011 and 2060. Public health 
care expenditure (acute and long-term care) should increase by 3 percentage points of GDP between 
2011 and 2060, the ageing population having an impact on those expenses and especially on long-term 
care.  
18 
 
Table 4 Budgetary costs of ageing: scenario with reform and impact of the reforms (difference 
between projection with and without reform) 
% of GDP 
Components of the budgetary 
costs 
Base scenario (with reforms) Impact of reforms 
2011 2030 2060 2011-2060 2011-2030 2011-2060 
Pensions 9.9 13.6 14.5 4.6 -0.2 -0.1 
- wage-earners 5.4 7.6 7.8 2.5 -0.2 -0.1 
-  self-employed 0.8 1.0 1.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 
-  civil servants 3.7 5.0 5.6 1.8 -0.1 0.1 
Health Carea 8.0 9.4 11.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 
Disability schemes 1.6 1.6 1.5 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
Unemploymentb 2.0 1.3 1.1 -0.9 -0.1 -0.1 
CELS/UCA 0.4 0.3 0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 
Child benefits 1.6 1.6 1.4 -0.2 0.0 0.0 
Other social expenditures 1.7 1.7 1.6 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
Total 25.3 29.5 31.4 6.1 -0.5 -0.3 
Source: High Council of Finance, Study Committee of Ageing, Yearly Report 2012 
a. Public expenditure, including long-term care. 
b. Including time credit and career breaks  
The impact of the structural reforms on the budgetary costs of ageing is further discussed by 
comparing the budgetary costs of ageing in percent of GDP with and without reform (right column of 
Table 4). The structural reforms of December 2011 reduce the budgetary cost of ageing by 0.3 
percentage point of GDP between 2011 and 2060, evenly distributed between pensions, 
unemployment and CELS/UCA. Besides the direct impact of the measures themselves, the increased 
GDP that results from the reform decreases, of course, the weight of social expenses in percent of 
GDP.  
4.2.1. Unemployment, career breaks and conventional early leavers’ scheme 
The average benefit level of the CELS/UCA is unaffected by the reform. The decrease in expenses due 
to the reform therefore comes from the reduction of the number of CELS/UCA beneficiaries: in 2060, 
almost 22,000 people, or 18% of the number of beneficiaries without reform, should not have access 
to this regime anymore, be it temporarily of definitively. Expenditure for unemployment and career 
breaks should also drop by 0.1 percentage point of GDP, as a result of, on the one hand, more strict 
access conditions for career breaks which lower the number of eligible persons, and, on the other, a 
decrease of average benefits due to the more outspoken decrease of the unemployment benefit with 
increased duration of the unemployment spell, and to the raised eligibility age for a seniority 
supplement. 
4.2.2. Pension schemes 
Table 4 shows that the impact of the reform should reduce pension expenses by 0.1 percentage point 
GDP between 2011 and 2060 only. Of course, the reform results in a decrease in the number of 
pensioners (almost 66,000 people in 2060 or 1.7% of the total number of pensioners) which reduces 
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pension expenditures in terms of GDP. Inversely, however, these expenditures themselves are 
increased by higher average pension benefits.  
During the transition period, expenditure reductions are made in the three pension schemes by a drop 
in the number of retirements, as career and age conditions are raised progressively until 2016. Civil 
servants are to postpone their retirement for a relatively longer period since, contrary to wage earners 
and the self-employed, they previously were not subject to a condition for early retirement. When the 
people who initially had to postpone their retirement actually will retire, they will receive a higher 
average pension benefit, mainly because of a longer career compared to the situation before the 
reform. The extent to which the average pension increases and whether these two effects cancel each 
other out, differs between schemes. On the whole, expenditures in the wage earners’ scheme are 
reduced, but in the self-employed scheme and especially the public sector, expenditures grow 
compared to a scenario without reform. 
a. Wage earners’ scheme 
In the wage earners’ scheme, the increase of average pensions – as a result of longer careers – amply 
compensates for the negative impact of the less favourable valuation of certain assimilated periods. 
Furthermore, the hypothesis that the modalities of the current pension bonus16 are maintained until the 
end of the projection period leads to a higher bonus and, thus, to a higher average pension. Meanwhilei 
the government has reformed the pension bonus to tune it to the pension reform, thereby only granting 
a bonus one year after the career condition for early retirement is met and work is continued. 
b. Self-employed scheme 
In the self-employed scheme, the increase of average pensions should more than compensate for the 
savings resulting from the smaller number of pensioners, owing to longer careers and a higher pension 
bonus (see also wage earners’ scheme) in the longer term, and lead to additional expenditure. 
Particularly in the self-employed scheme, career extension leads to a higher number of, mainly female, 
pensioners who meet the conditions for a minimum pension, which in its turn raises the average 
pension. Moreover, the increased flexibility of the penalty system contributes to higher average 
pensions for new pensioners. By 2060, pension expenditure for the self-employed should be 0.5% 
higher than in a scenario without reform. But when expressed in percentage of GDP, as shown in 
Table 4, this increase is cancelled out. During the process, the government decided to reform the 
pension bonus for the self-employed, brining it in accordance with the system in the wage earners’ 
pension scheme.  
c. Civil servants’ scheme 
Additional expenditure by the year 2060 is also projected in the civil servants’ scheme: 3.7% more 
than in a scenario without reform, or 0.1 percent point if GDP growth is taken into account. Compared 
to wage earners or the self-employed, civil servants are to postpone their retirement for a longer period 
                                                          
16  A pension bonus of € 2.2 (prices on 1/2/2012) per day of actual service is granted to wage earners and the self-employed which continue 
to work after the age of 62 or after a career of at least 44 years. According to the law, the bonus entered into effect on 1/1/2007 and ends 
on 1/12/2013. 
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because of insufficient career years. This career extension leads to a higher average pension. 
Moreover, as a result of retirement at a higher age, more pensioners benefit from a (higher) age 
supplement17. This age supplement is responsible for almost 50% of the additional expenditure 
compared to a scenario without reform. It may therefore come as no surprize that in the meantime the 
government has decided to abolish this age supplement for civil servants and replace it by the same 
pension bonus as in the general scheme for wage earners and the self-employed. 
5. The social impact of social security reform 
This section starts with a caveat. The figures below show the impact of pension reform on pensioners 
and of unemployment reform on the unemployed. The change of a benefit, however, affects the 
equivalent income of the household of the beneficiary and therefore changes the poverty risk of all the 
members of the household. As Figures 2 and 3 show the impact of pension reform for pensioners and 
Figure 5 the impact of unemployment reform for the unemployed, both figures ignore the indirect 
impact on non-beneficiaries. We have however chosen to limit the discussion to beneficiaries in order 
to present the impact of the reform measures graphically. 
5.1. Impact of pension reform on the poverty risk of the pensioners 
The recent social security reform is mainly a pension reform. This section will therefore analyse the 
impact of this reform on pension adequacy first. The main indicator analysed is the risk of poverty rate 
of retirees. The global impact of the reform can be seen in Figure 2. The risk of poverty rate of retirees 
decreases progressively as a result of the reform. In 2060, the reduction should reach 4 percentage 
points. The progressivity of this reduction indicates that the impact of this reform on poverty operates 
mainly in the long run.  
Finally, the small discontinuity in 2023 in the scenario without reform is due to the impact of the 
medium-term wage growth rate on the poverty line. As the wage growth rate differs between scenarios 
in the medium run, this small peak appears one year later in the scenario with reform.  
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
                                                          
17  Since 1/1/2001, an age supplement is granted to civil servants who continue their career after the age of 60. The age supplement 
increases with the age and amounts to 1.5% of the pension for retirement at 61, running up to 9% of the pension for retirement at 65. 
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 Source:   own calculations using MIDAS 
Figure 3 presents the impact of the reform on the poverty risk of retirees differentiated by gender. For 
men, the decrease in poverty rate appears immediately after the introduction of the reform. With more 
restricted eligibility conditions for early retirement, individuals are stimulated to postpone retirement. 
Consequently, as career length increases, retirement benefits do so as well.  
In 2060, the poverty rate reduction of retirees should reach almost 4 percentage points for men and 
almost 5 percentage points for women. Even if this decrease is slightly higher for women in absolute 
terms, the decrease is largely more important for men (-50%) than for women (-30%) when we 
consider the variation of poverty in relative terms. 
Finally, Figure 3 shows that the reduction of the poverty risk as a result of the reform sets off almost a 
decade later for women than for men.  
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Figure 2: Risk of poverty rate of retirees – Comparison between a scenario with structural 
reforms and a scenario without structural reforms, in percent 
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 Source: own calculations using MIDAS. 
Figure 4 allows for a better understanding the various impacts of the pension reform. Its left panel 
presents the evolution of the average retirement benefit by gender, while its right panel shows the 
evolution of the average equivalent income of pensioners by gender. The differences observed in the 
right panel of Figure 4 obviously result from single male and female pensioners, as well as from 
pensioners whose partner is not retired. That the differences in the long run are more outspoken in the 
left than in the right panel is due to the redistribution of the impact of the reform between household 
members. The comparison of these two figures allows, in addition to explaining the evolution of 
poverty rates, to understand the role of household composition and income composition in households. 
To facilitate the discussion of Figure 4, it is useful to discern between three groups of workers. Those 
with very short careers and those with very long careers are for opposite reasons unaffected by the 
reform: the former because they do not meet the requirements for early retirement before as well as 
after the reform, and the latter because they do. The first group consists mainly of women, whereas 
men are predominant in the second group. It is the third group, consisting of workers with a ‘middle’ 
career length that have to postpone their retirement because of the reform. Next, we turn to the 
discussion of Figure 4. In stark contradiction to men, both the average retirement benefit and the 
average equivalent income decrease for women in the years following the introduction of the reform. 
Even if this reform incites people to work more, wage-earners and the self-employed who were not 
eligible for early retirement before the reform are by definition not impacted by the reform, since this 
makes the conditions for early retirement stricter. They therefore continue to work, as in the situation 
without the reform, until the normal retirement age of 65. As mentioned before, women are 
proportionally overrepresented in this group. Therefore, during the years directly following the 
Figure 3: Risk of poverty rate of retirees by gender – Comparison between a scenario with structural reforms and a 
scenario without structural reforms, in percent 
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introduction of the reform and compared to the situation without reform, as only women with mid-
length careers are forced to postpone their retirement as a result of the reform, those female wage-
earners and self-employed who do enter retirement at 65 are mainly those with short careers. This 
overrepresentation leads to lower retirement benefits for newly retired women in the reform scenario 
and in the short run.  
INSERT FIGURE 4 (LEFT AND RIGHT PANEL) ABOUT HERE 
LEFT PANEL: AVERAGE PROPORTIONAL CHANGE OF RETIREMENT BENEFIT BY 
GENDER 
RIGHT PANEL: AVERAGE PROPORTIONALE CHANGE OF EQUIVALENT INCOME BY 
GENDER 
 
The selection effect in the short run, where mainly women with a short career remain unaffected by 
the reform whereas others postpone retirement, results in the somewhat paradoxical situation in which 
the average female career length decreases while the average female retirement age increases. This has 
a negative effect on the average net retirement benefit of female pensioners and thus reduces their 
equivalent income. 
For men of various subsequent cohorts, the distribution of the career length is more or less stable and 
high. Thus, the number of men entering in retirement from working will be lower each year as a result 
of the reform. For women, on the contrary, the average career length is currently considerably lower 
and expected to increase in time. As a result, the reform will prevent many women to enter into 
retirement in the short run. Those small numbers of retiring women will have careers short enough not 
to be affected by the reform. When the women affected by the reform will finally become eligible for 
retirement, there will be a catching-up and many women will enter into retirement in a relatively short 
time span, having considerably longer careers than their predecessors. The reform therefore has a 
stronger impact on women than on men. 
Figure 4: Average net retirement benefits of pensioners, by gender (left panel) and average net equivalent income of 
pensioners, by gender (right panel), difference with scenario without reform in percent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Source: own calculations using MIDAS 
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5.2. The impact of unemployment reform on the poverty risk of the unemployed 
Figure 5 compares the poverty risk among the unemployed in the reform scenario and in the non-
reform scenario. Before proceeding, a caveat must be highlighted. In the current version of MIDAS, 
the income from savings, capital or occupational pension systems are not taken into account. As a 
result, the poverty threshold of 60% of the median equivalent income is lower than the ‘official’ 
poverty line that is derived from the EU-SILC data (EU statistics on income and living conditions). 
This reveals itself specifically in a poverty risk among the unemployed that is considerably lower in 
the model than resulting from the SILC data. In order to approach the actual poverty risk and therefore 
to be able to capture the impact of the reform of the unemployment system, the results below are based 
on a poverty threshold of 70% of the median equivalent income. 
Figure 5 presents the impact of reform of the unemployment system on the unemployed and 
immediately shows that the poverty risk increases as a result of the reform, an impact which is more 
important for men than for women.  
INSERT FIGURE 5 (LEFT AND RIGHT PANEL) ABOUT HERE 
LEFT PANEL: AROP FOR MEN 
RIGHT PANEL: AROP FOR WOMEN 
 
 
To understand this difference in impact, one must recall the differences in reform for various 
categories of beneficiaries, as well as how men and women are distributed among those categories. 
Figure 5: Risk of poverty rate of unemployed computed at 70% of the equivalent income, by gender (men on the left 
and women on the right)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Source: own calculations using MIDAS. 
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There are 3 types of unemployed persons: those living with dependent household members, those 
living with not-dependent household members and unemployed singles. Of these three categories, the 
first and the last are particularly affected by the reform of the unemployment system. The poverty risk 
of the unemployed with dependent household members and unemployed singles therefore increases 
considerably, whereas the impact of reform is limited for the unemployed living with non-dependent 
household members. Another reason for this impact is that, almost by definition, the latter category of 
unemployed benefits from the (unchanged) contributions of the non-dependent household members to 
the equivalent household income, which is not the case for the other two categories. 
Official statistics from the National Employment Office (“Office national de l’emploi” - ONEM) show 
that men are predominant among the unemployed living with dependent-household members and 
among unemployed singles. Women, on the other hand, are dominant among the unemployed living 
with non-dependent household members. As a result, Figure 5 shows that the reform of the 
unemployment system has a greater impact on unemployed men than on unemployed women. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper discusses the impact of recent reform of the social security system, including the pension 
schemes, the conventional early leavers’ scheme, the general unemployment scheme, on the 
development of sustainability and adequacy in Belgium. The impact analysis follows earlier work by 
Dekkers, Desmet and Inagaki (2012) in demonstrating how two separate yet consistent models can be 
used to assess the budgetary and social impact of social security reform. 
The structural reforms of December 2011 reduce the budgetary cost of ageing by 0.3 percentage point 
of GDP between 2011 and 2060, evenly distributed among pensions, unemployment and CELS/UCA. 
Besides the direct impact of the measures themselves, the increased GDP resulting from the reform 
decreases, of course, the weight of social expenses in percent of GDP. Furthermore, the Belgian 
government introduced in the general scheme for wage earners and the self-employed a new pension 
bonus that is tuned with the December 2011 pension reform. Additional savings are realised in the 
civil servants’ scheme (approximately 0.1% of GDP in the long run) because of the introduction of the 
new pension bonus which replaces the expensive age supplement.  
The risk of poverty rate of retirees decreases progressively as a result of the reform. In 2060, the 
reduction should reach 4 percentage points (4 percentage points for men and 5 percentage points for 
women) Furthermore, the poverty risk of unemployed men in particular increases considerably. 
To conclude this paper, it should be noted that more reform actions are needed for Belgium to cope 
with the budgetary impacts of population ageing. A recent study by the Federal Planning Bureau 
(Desmet, et al., 2013) has examined how possible reform measures might reduce the impact of 
demographic ageing on the financial sustainability of public finances. Even with a more severe career 
condition than today (45 years instead of 40 years for early retirement), public debt would still 
increase considerably in the long run. A policy mix of phasing out public debt, higher productivity 
growth, and increased employment and pension reforms would be required to stabilise public debt in 
the long run. 
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